A BRIGHT FUTURE How Some Countries Have Solved Climate Change and the Rest Can Follow Joshua S. Goldstein Staffan A. Qvist Steven Pinker (Fwd.) New York: PublicAffairs, January 2019 |
Rating: 5.0 High |
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ISBN-13 978-1-5417-2410-5 | ||||
ISBN-10 1-5417-2410-0 | 276pp. | HC/BWI | $26.00 |
Written by a professor of international relations and an engineer, this book lays out the path to a clean-energy future in terms that are clear and easy to read.
But first there is a Foreword by Steven Pinker, Johnstone Family Professor of Psychology at Harvard University. Dr. Pinker expresses what seem to me contradictory views. First:
"Surveys have shown that people resist accepting the reality of human-made climate change not because they are scientifically ignorant but because they associate the claim with the political Left and with communitarian and puritanical values regarding modern life with which they do not sympathize. And the traditional environmental movement has treated climate change like other environmental problems and advocated measures like conservation and small-scale energy generation that are not commensurate with the magnitude of the threat to human well-being." – Page viii |
For decades, the traditional solutions of conservation and small, distributed energy sources have been a small part of the proposed solution to climate change. Advocates of action on climate change demand political solutions which include: ending subsidies for fossil fuels; enacting a tax on carbon emissions; international agreements to monitor carbon emissions and set goals for emission reductions. They also advocate phasing out fossil fuels, especially coal, and ramping up nuclear power as well as renewables ASAP.1
And of course many people associate all these measures with "the political Left." That is the association that "the political Right" wants them to make. Over the past several decades in the U.S., the Republican Party and its enablers have devoted a great deal of energy to reinforcing this association, as well as to discrediting the very idea that humans can cause climate change. Next from Dr. Pinker:
"Humanity has never faced a problem like this, and the popular solutions are not up to the challenge." – Page ix |
Naturally not, since — owing to the propaganda efforts I mentioned — any comprehensive solution to climate change is unpopular in this country.
But enough about Dr. Pinker. Let me turn to Dr. Qvist and Professor Goldstein. They begin by comparing Sweden and Germany — a most instructive exercise. Let me summarize: in 2016, Germany and Sweden had identical per-capita GDP (US$50,000). Yet Sweden emitted only half the CO2 of Germany per capita in 2014 (roughly 5 vs. 10 tons.) See page 30. How did Sweden do it? Kärnkraft!
Sorry; at times I can't help but burst into song. But seriously: Kärnkraft, as the authors convincingly argue in this book, is the way to go if you want to cut carbon emissions while keeping a steady supply of electrical power. As you've probably guessed, and as they reveal on page 28, Kärnkraft is Swedish for nuclear power.
But of course there's more to the story than quality of electrical power. The story turns on quality of life as well. And that depends on the public acceptance of coal vs. nuclear power, which in turn depends on the public perception of risk. It has long been common for people to fear things that are not very dangerous while blithely accepting lethal practices as routine parts of everyday life. Such is the case with nuclear power and coal. A segment of the public is subject to a sort of taboo on nuclear power. Radioactive waste is not something to treat casually, of course. But categorical rejection of all forms of nuclear power springs from fears which are largely irrational. The authors maintain that nuclear power is seen as scary but is very safe, while coal is seen as benign but is very dangerous. The authors make their case well, but they do it diffusely, across many pages. An example:
"So this, then, is the safety record of nuclear power over more than fifty years, encompassing more than 16,000 reactor-years: one serious fatal accident in the USSR with possibly, over time, up to 4,000 deaths; one Japanese 'disaster' that caused no deaths; and one American accident that destroyed an expensive facility but otherwise just generated vast quantities of fearful hype. In the United States, nuclear power continues to produce about one-fifth of the nation's electric supply and has never killed anyone."3 – Page 93 |
Much alarm has been generated over the major nuclear-reactor accidents: Three Mile Island (TMI), Chernobyl, and Fukushima Daiichi. No deaths due to radiation from TMI or Fukushima Daiichi have been confirmed. Chernobyl killed several dozen, mainly first responders who struggled to contain the disaster. The local population was exposed to radioactive iodine (I-131) from the reactor. As a result, several thousand children developed thyroid cancer. Most recovered.
Consider some other sorts of industrial accidents. One involved the release of gaseous methyl cyanate from a chemical plant in 1984. This disaster, at Bhopal in India, is considered the worst industrial accident. However, in the aggregate, deaths due to coal mining and use exceed the toll of Bhopal. The same is due to injuries and disease. Here are some numbers (except Bhopal, everything U.S.-based.)
Let me see if I can concentrate their message. A European study found 30 deaths per terawatt-hour (TWh) of energy from coal, versus less than 0.1 per TWh of energy from nuclear. Thus, based on mortality records, nuclear power is 300 times as safe as coal.
When it comes to harmful emissions, again coal far exceeds nuclear power. True, building a nuclear power plant involves considerable CO2. So does decommissioning it, and making and moving replacement fuel rods creates some. But the same is true for building and demolishing coal-fired plants — and in between each plant burns tons of coal every day, and must be fed daily by a long coal train. The coal plant also emits particulates with major health impacts, and its wastes can have major impacts if the dam holding them should break (which has happened a number of times in the U.S.)
Like Germany and Japan, a number of U.S. states are shutting down their nuclear power plants well before the end of their useful lives.4 In most cases, the lost power is made up from fossil-fuel plants. The Vermont Yankee plant is an example. When it was shut down in 2014 by state mandate, natural gas took up the slack. The company wanted to build new supply pipelines, which would drive up the cost of energy locally. Protesters blocked or delayed the pipelines, and the company blocked new gas hookups for local communities.5 That is where things stood when the book went to press. See pages 145-152 of Chapter 11, "Keep What We've Got."
The authors' message, then, is a common-sense one. First, keep existing nuclear plants going as long as they can operate safely. Second, move the development of GEN-III and GEN-IV reactor designs forward with all deliberate speed. Third, end fossil-fuels subsidies and put a price on carbon emissions. Fourth, install renewable power wherever it improves the local situation.
In particular, Chapter 14, "Pricing Carbon Pollution," is excellent. It covers the advantages of cap and trade, or a carbon fee or tax, over draconian regulations. And here again Sweden is the standout, while Germany's rules run counter to it.
"Sweden has had a carbon tax since 1991, currently the world's highest at more than $150/ton. Sweden has reduced emissions by 25 percent in that period (that is, after the big drop in the 1980s with the build-out of nuclear power). The carbon tax has driven shifts across the economy, notably in the use of biomass (forest and forest-product waste) instead of fossil fuels for district heating in cities (and heat pumps using clean electricity for houses without district heating). It has also spurred Swedish companies to create carbon-saving innovative technologies that find markets around the world, boosting the Swedish economy. "For most of its history, the Swedish carbon tax applied at full force to households and services, and at a much lower rate—about one-third and as low as zero in some cases—to industries either covered by the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) or deemed to be at risk of shifting production to countries without carbon pricing. "Germany does not have a carbon price. Its coal-powered electricity, with only the minor upcharge of the EU's ETS, goes onto the northern European grid and competes with Sweden's clean electricity. You might think that Germany is only burning so much coal to meet its own needs as its nuclear power plants shut down, but in fact in 2015 (the latest data available), Germany exported 48 TWh of electricity, about the output of two massive coal plants such as Jänschwalde. The competition from coal-powered, carbon-tax-free German electricity has undermined the profitability of Sweden's nuclear power plants." – Pages 197-198 |
I think the authors get a little too derisive about anti-nuke protesters at one or two places. Also, they are too sanguine about deaths due to nuclear power in the U.S., possible diversion of bomb-grade materials, and radiological contamination due to U.S. Navy reactors (see my Errata page.) However, I like their overall prescription for climate change. They present the case clearly and well. This book is an easy read, and its endnotes document the sources of the authors' thorough research. The text is supplemented by charts and graphs and black-and-white pictures, and there is an excellent Index. Full marks, and those endnotes make it a keeper.