UNDERMINING SCIENCE Suppression and Distortion in the Bush Administration Seth Shulman Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006 |
Rating: 5.0 High |
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ISBN-13 978-0-520-24702-4 | ||||
ISBN 0-520-24702-7 | 202pp. | HC | $? |
Shulman emphasizes the crucial distinction between rejecting unwanted policy options and rejecting or altering the facts that support those unwanted options. There is a bright line between the two courses. The Bush administration consistently crosses the line and chooses the latter course; indeed, they have done their best to institutionalize that behavior. This is nowhere more clear than in their approach to abortion. This administration (like most Republican administrations in recent decades) refuses federal funding to abortion clinics. When America elects a leadership that feels abortion is wrong, this is a legitimate policy option. What is not legitimate is to alter a medical study so it appears to find a link between abortion and cancer. Yet members of the Bush administration did exactly that.
This distinction cannot be repeated too often: For a government to reject unwanted policies is legitimate; for it to reject unwanted facts is flat wrong. That the Bush administration — by stuffing advisory panels with ideologues, letting industry lawyers gut or shelve scientific papers, and dismissing dissenters — makes such a concerted effort to alter or suppress facts they find uncomfortable bespeaks a certain desperation.
As Shulman describes it:
The public views the war in Iraq as the Bush administration's major malfeasance, with its inept handling of Hurricane Katrina running a close second.
But I think that messing with science facts is a far worse offense. The systematic subversion of scientific investigation is, to a largely scientifically illiterate public, far less visible. It is also more pervasive, more pernicious, and likely to take longer to fix.
Every American knows what it means to toss away soldiers' lives in a wasted war. Not all understand the cost of tossing aside the facts that would let us decide whether and how to undertake that war — or to conserve gasoline, stave off a flu epidemic, or deal with climate change. These are complicated questions to resolve; but rejecting data that doesn't fit party politics will never make them simpler to resolve. We must resolve to honor the data, whatever they tell us.
It's all about knowing where we really stand. That is the solid base for any leap into the future; but which direction we choose to leap is ours to decide.
The issue of whether or not one opposes abortion is a moral and political question. The question of whether a link exists between abortion and breast cancer is not a political question. It is an empirical question about the most up-to-date and best-supported scientific knowledge. In the extraordinary climate created by the Bush administration, though, it is not enough for scientists to investigate the facts of a given situation; they now must often explain to policymakers that facts matter in the first place. As the eminent Stanford University scientist Richard N. Zare wrote in the San Francisco Chronicle in 2005, "We must be willing to speak out against the threat of making science just a matter of opinion." "Scientific theories are more than just a special set of opinions that the scientific community is trying to push onto the public in opposition to religious belliefs," noted Zare, who served on the National Science Board under Clinton and Bush senior. "To pretend otherwise is to invite the decline of our nation." – Pages 4-5 |
The table below, drawn from Shulman's book, hints at the extent of the problem.1 The table lists agencies or individuals who have acted to distort or suppress accurate scientific findings, and briefly describes each instance. Note that only interference with actual research is shown. Thus, important distortions in other areas are omitted. Two noteworthy examples are those reported by Richard A. Clarke and Paul O'Neill. Shulman discusses these on pages 11 and 12. Also omitted from the table is any discussion of the Bush administration's approach to sex education (pages 53-60) and the AIDS epidemic (pages 60-63.) Their preferred countermeasure for both is a pledge of abstinence. They are spending hundreds of millions on abstinence-only sex-education programs. About that, a CDC scientist had this to say:
Think of it this way: If the issue were transportation and you were trying to reduce highway fatalities, the Bush administration's policy is to issue gold-plated "Drive Safely" bumper stickers. That's bad enough as it is, but it becomes literally criminal when the same government denies funding for seat belts and air bags. – Page 56 |
Date(s) | Official & Role | Effect & Outcome | Page |
---|---|---|---|
Nov. 2003 | Over scientists' objections, unknown staff of National Cancer Institute altered NCI fact sheet to link abortion to breast cancer. | After a public outcry, the NCI repudiated the link, which no scientific study supported. | 4 |
2004 | Rep. Brian Baird (D-WA), member of House Science Committee, stated, "In countless subtle and not so subtle ways, the administration and Republican majorities who control the House and Senate are deliberately and systematically suppressing discussion and criticism and distorting the scientific process." | As of this writing, July 2007, the suppression continues. | 7 |
Nov. 2002 | Richard Foster, chief actuary for the Medicare program, found Medicare reform would cost $200B more than White House estimate. | Foster was prevented from releasing his findings. | 7 |
Nov. 2002? | Thomas Scully, Chief of Medicare office, threatened to fire Foster if he told Congress. | Congress passed flawed Medicare reform bill. When story broke, Scully resigned and took job in pharmaceutical industry. | 8 |
2002 | Tommy G. Thompson, HHS Secretary, rejected 3 well-qualified ergonomics experts for National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health peer review panel. | At least two of the experts supported a workplace ergonomics standard, contrary to Bush administration policy. | 9-10 |
2001 | George Bush, President. Took eight months to name a White House Science Advisor. After choosing John H. Marburger III, symbolically demoted the respected physicist by stripping him of the title of "Assistant to the President" and moving the office of Science Advisor out of the Executive Office Building. | TBA. | 11 |
May 2003 | Christine Todd Whitman, Director of EPA, told a reporter she was called disloyal in meetings for requesting the factual basis of decisions. | Resigned in May 2003. During the 2004 elections, she denied making the statement. But by then other sources had come forward with similar reports. | 11 |
2001 | Dr. Rosina Bierbaum, a Clinton appointee to the Office of Science and Technology Policy who continued to serve into 2001. She stated: "The scientists [who] knew the most about climate change at OSTP were not allowed to participate in deliberations on the issue within the White House inner circle." | Resigned 2001. | 11 |
2005 | Philip Cooney, chief of staff for Council on Environmental Quality (2001-2005). Altered numerous official scientific reports including the 2003 annual report of the Climate Change Science Program. In all cases the effect was to make their conclusions less certain and tone down the apparent urgency of the situation. | Prior to his appointment to the CEQ, Cooney (with no scientific credentials), had been a staff attorney with the American Petroleum Institute for a decade. He resigned his CEQ post on 10 June 2005, two days after information on his activities was published in the New York Times. (Much of this information was made public by Rick Piltz.) Within a week, Cooney had been hired by ExxonMobil. | 18-21 |
Mar. 2005 | Rick S. Piltz, Policy analyst in Climate Change Science Program (1995-2005). Documented intentional distortion of science. | Resigned in protest March 2005; said officials had acted to "impede forthright communication of the state of climate science and its implications for society." Started Web site Climate Science Watch. | 20-21 |
2002 | Myron Ebell, Lobbyist for ExxonMobil-funded Competitive Enterprise Institute. Worked with Cooney to discredit EPA. | Short-term success | 24-25 |
Jan. 2006 | James E. Hansen, Director, NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies. Charged Bush administration, and specifically George Deutsch, with trying to silence him. | Prevailed. | 26 |
Jan. 2006 | George Deutsch, a public affairs officer at NASA. Refused press access to Hansen, altered press releases to de-emphasize evolution. | Resigned when his resume was found to be inaccurate. | 26 |
Sep. 2003 | William Hohenstein, Official in USDA chief economists's office. Forwarded request to update USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service pamphlet about carbon sequestration to CEQ. | After CEQ objected, NRCS dropped the request. | 27 |
Jan. 2006 | Various staff of Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality altered AHRQ report to remove data on adverse health care outcomes for minorities. | Congressional investigation | 32 |
? | Rep. Henry Waxman, Chair of House Committee on Government Reform. Ordered investigation into AHRQ staff activities. | Pending | 32 |
Unknown | Dr. Carolyn Clancy, AHRQ director. Reinstated original version of report, but referred to controversial changes as result of a "routine review." | Indications are the altered report would have been issued if a disgruntled staffer had not leaked the original. | 33 |
Unknown | Karen Migdail, AHRQ spokesperson. Confirmed Dr. Clancy's view, calling the alteration part of "a normal clearance process." | What does this imply for the reports whose original versions haven't been exposed? | 33-34 |
Unknown | Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary, Health and Human Services. Rejected five staff-selected nominees for CDC Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention. Appointed five other members known to oppose stricter standards on lead exposure. Dr. Susan Cummins, Committee director 1995-2000, called the intervention unprecedented. | This action blocked the Committee's likely recommendation of a stricter standard. Four-year committee member Dr. Michael Weitzman, chief of pediatrics at the University of Rochester, was dismissed by Thompson's office. His replacement was Dr. William Banner, at the time an expert witness for the Lead Industries Association in a legal case. Both he and another appointee, Dr. Sergio Piomelli, admittted that they were first contacted about serving by representatives from the lead-paint industry. | 35-37 |
Unknown | William Pierce, Health and Human Services spokesperson. When asked about Thompson's rejection of candidates his scientific staff had recommended for the lead exposure panel, he replied that HHS was free to appoint whomever it wanted. | Mr. Pierce further stated that some 258 advisory panels fall under the purview of HHS and that, at the direction of President Bush, Secretary Thompson planned to "closely and actively oversee" the appointments of scientists to all of them. | 35-37 |
Feb. 2002 | The Department of Agriculture issued an agencywide policy directive requiring all staff scientists to get prior approval before publishing or speaking publically on "sensitive issues" — the term being defined as "agricultural practices with negative health and environmental consequences, e.g. global climate change; contamination of water by hazardous materials (nutrients, pesticides and pathogens); animal feeding operations or crop production practices that negatively affect soil, water or air quality." | A noteworthy effect of this policy was on the work of Dr. James Zahn. Shortly after joining USDA in 2000 as a research microbiologist, Dr. Zahn found significant levels of airborne antibiotic-resistant bacteria near large hog farms in Iowa and Missouri. His superiors encouraged him — until the Bush administration came in. Then, he was forbidden to publish or present his findings on no fewer than eleven occasions. Industry had some influence on this. Dr. Zahn received permission to address the Board of Health in Adair, Iowa; this permission was withdrawn after the National Pork Producers Council complained to the USDA. | 38-39 |
August 2003 | Ann M. Veneman, Secretary of Agriculture. Announced that the U.S. would resume import of some Canadian beef products, explaining that "Our experts have thoroughly reviewed the scientific evidence and determined that the risk to public health is extremely low." (In May 2003, a case of bovine spongiform encepalopathy (BSE) or "mad cow disease" had been discovered in Canada. As U.S. law requires, import of all Canadian beef had been halted.) | A top USDA official said that no risk assessment had been done at the time of Veneman's announcement, and further that, as she moved to open the border to more Canadian beef products, the menu of questions put before USDA's risk assessment branch was repeatedly altered to get answers that would support the decision already made. The highly placed anonymous source released documents that corroborated his claim. | 40-41 |
Feb. 2004 | Anne Trontell, deputy director, FDA Office of Drug Safety. Refused permission for Dr. Andrew Mosholder to present his research to a meeting of FDA scientists. (A highly credentialed physician with the Office of Drug Safety, Dr. Mosholder had been tasked in June 2003 to review data from clinical trials of commonly prescribed antidepressants. He found a link between these drugs and suicidal behavior in children.) | The FDA claimed that Dr. Mosholder's work did not constitute "a completely finalized document." Ultimately, his findings proved accurate and led to warning labels on certain antidepressants. Yet not only was he prevented from sharing his conclusions with other FDA scientists, but the FDA IG threatened him with criminal prosecution if he discussed the matter with anyone. | 42-43 |
Aug. 2004 | Dr. Lester Crawford, acting FDA commissioner. Criticized Dr. David Graham for not submitting his work on Vioxx to internal review prior to sending a manuscript to the British medical journal The Lancet. Dr. Steven K. Galson, FDA's acting director of drug-evaluation division, told reporters that Dr. Graham's work on Vioxx was "junk science" and e-mailed an editor at The Lancet, disputing the integrity of his data. Previously, unnamed FDA officials had even tried to get Dr. Graham to resign. (Dr. Graham found that Vioxx increased the risk of cardiac problems and if prescribed in high doses could in fact triple the risk of heart attack. But the FDA appeared more concerned with protecting pharmaceutical giant Merck's annual $1 billion in revenues from the popular painkiller than with public health. They took no action to pull Vioxx from the market.) |
FDA managers had tried to silence Dr. Graham from the beginnning and even tried to get him to resign. He went to the Government Accountability Project (GAP) for help, and GAP's legal director Tom Devine reported getting an anonymous phone call saying that Graham had bullied other staffers into approving his flawed study. Devine later traced this call to the offices of FDA's management. Devine also reported that Dr. Graham had submitted his manuscript for internal approval several weeks before sending it to The Lancet. Ultimately, other researchers confirmed Dr. Graham's findings. Under intense public pressure, Merck withdrew its flawed product. |
43-45 |
Feb. 2004 | The FDA is required by law to approve drugs that are both safe and effective. Yet Dr. Steven K. Galson, acting director of FDA's drug-evaluation division, rejected the findings of two advisory panels and the recommendations of his own staff to withhold non-prescription status for the drug levonorgestrel. | Unlike Vioxx, this drug is not a painkiller; it is an emergency contraceptive: Hence the name "Plan B" under which levonorgestrel is marketed, suggestive of its use in cases where conventional contraceptives fail. Manufactured by Barr Pharmaceuticals of New York, it had been available under prescription in the U.S. since 1999. France, Great Britain, and 30 other countries make it available without a prescription. Millions of women have used it without problem; few drugs are safer. The reason that Dr. Galson declared Plan B "non-approvable" is apparently moral rather than medical. This reflects the ardently held views of one Dr. W. David Hager, a member of the FDA's Reproductive Health Advisory Committee. Dr. Hager, a Kentucky-based ob-gyn, refuses on moral grounds to prescribe Plan B to his own patients. It was he who first came up with the spurious argument that adolescent girls would not understand how to use the drug properly. Hager's real concern, which Galson apparently shares, is promiscuity. This is also a discredited argument. Barr Pharmaceuticals responded to Galson's letter by requesting approval to sell Plan B behind the counter so that pharmacists could deny it to underage women. But in August 2005, the FDA decided to postpone a decision indefinitely. Two members of its advisory panels resigned in protest as a result. |
46-53 |
Aug. 2003 | Jeffrey R. Holmstead, EPA assistant administrator for air and radiation. Redefined the New Source Review threshold for routine maintenance of power plants as up to 20% of each generator's value, after Sylvia Lowrance, deputy administrator for enforcement, had recommended a value of 0.75 percent. Holmstead was an associate White House counsel for George H. W. Bush. During the Clinton administration he worked for Latham & Watkins, a firm representing several electric utilities fighting air pollution regulations. |
Several utilities had been cited by the Clinton administration for skipping the required pollution controls when they modernized their plants. Sylvia Lowrance, top EPA enforcer (1996-2002), called it "the most significant noncompliance pattern EPA had ever found." The Bush administration's so-called Clear Skies Initiative was actually relief for the utilities, but it stalled in the House after Eric Schaeffer told the press that current laws were better. Holmstead's 20 percent threshold was an end run around that roadblock. He left the administration in 2005 — but not before helping to gut the mercury-emission provisions of the Clean Air Act and weaken forest protections with the "Healthy Forests" initiative. | 64-71 |
Mar. 2004 | William Wehrun, a senior advisor to Holmstead. Advised a meeting of a dozen EPA staffers intending to begin studies on the impact of new power-plant mercury-emission regulations that the studies would be postponed indefinitely. Holmstead had presided at the meeting. He later told two EPA staffers who complained that there would be no studies because of "White House concerns." |
Wehrum later replaced Holmstead as EPA assistant administrator for air and radiation. Like his former boss, he had worked as a lawyer for Latham & Watkins. The proposed rules are much weaker than those of the Clean Air Act. They were found to contain twelve paragraphs lifted from a document prepared by industry lawyers at Latham & Watkins. The administration released them in final form in March 2005. Eleven states have already sued the EPA on the basis that they violate the Clean Air Act. |
71-75 |
Feb. 2004 | J. Steven Griles, a deputy secretary at the Interior Department. Altered the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process relating to mountaintop-removal coal mining, making it easier for coal companies to dump the waste in situ. A memo from Griles to the White House Council on Environmental Quality directed that a new draft EIS should "focus on centralizing and streamlining coal-mining permitting" and not on ways to limit the environmental damage caused by the waste dumping. Prior to joining Interior, Griles was a mining industry lobbyist. |
The new, industry-friendly EIS process is projected to have allowed the devastation of 1.4 million Appalachian acres by 2008 — an area the size of the state of Delaware. Many officials expressed outrage over the prospect and the subversion of sound science that fostered it. Fifty environmental groups challenged the draft EIS as a violation of the National Environmental Protection Act. | 76-80 |
2003 | Chris Nolin, chief of the division of conservation and classification, Washington office of Fish & Wildlife Service. Told the press that the benefits section was cut from an endangered-species cost-benefit analysis because use of its methodology was "discouraged" by the OMB. | The species was the bull trout, listed as endangered in the Pacific Northwest since 1998. Per a 2003 court settlement, the FWS contracted with a private firm to do the cost-benefit analysis of protecting the fish. That firm found that protection would cost $230-$300 million over a decade, but would likely yield $215 million in benefits from sport fishing and related activities. When the report was released, the 55-page section describing the benefits was simply missing. An anonymous FWS employee leaked it, and it was published in a Montana newspaper. Diane Katzenberger, an information officer at the Denver FWS office, said the censorship had not occurred in a regional office but "was a policy decision made at the Washington level." Hence the justification by Mr. Nolin — a justification which fails because the same methodology has in fact been used for other benefits analyses, notably one which estimated $113 billion in benefits from the Clear Skies Initiative. |
81-85 |
Jan. 2003 | Steven A. Williams, then director of FWS. Decided not to list the rare Trumpeter Swan as endangered on the basis of flawed analyses. Overruled the unanimous recommendation of his own scientists and refused to release their report. | The principal basis of Williams's decision was a study by James Dubovsky and John Cornely. These two scientists did not submit their work for peer review, and their conclusions run counter to the preponderance of scientific analysis. Williams also cited a 1987 study by wildlife biologist Ruth Gale Shea — and she says that the FWS position is diametrically opposite to her paper's actual conclusions. Following the initial FWS ruling, the nonprofit group Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER) filed a complaint under the Data Quality Act of 2000. PEER asked Williams to review his ruling. He turned them down. It was later learned (through FOIA requests) that he had done a review, but did not like its answer. In March 2004 he overrruled the review panel, denied PEER's appeal, and continued to refuse endangered status for the Trumpeters. |
85-87 |
Nov. 2002 | Andrew Eller Jr., a FWS biologist with a seventeen-year career. Unable to get his superiors to correct inflated numbers for the Florida panther population, he finally filed a complaint under the Data Quality Act of 2000. An outside panel convened to help develop a conservation strategy for the panther concurs with Eller, but has also met resistance from FWS. | Eller won his challenge. His reward was to be fired in November 2004, just after Bush won reelection. He fought the dismissal and was reinstated, but at his request will get a different position. It is still unclear whether FWS will act to protect the Florida panther. | 87-88 |
Nov. 2000 | Craig Manson, assistant secretary for fish and wildlife and parks. Displeased with the report of a group of biologists on Missouri River flows, he convened a new panel. It remains to be seen whether the adjusted recommendations, published in December 2003, will protect the endangered species under consideration, but they do satisfy the commercial interests who want more constant flows on the Missouri. | Manson's concern for species loss is shallow. At a public conference, he said: "If we are saying that the loss of species in and of itself is inherently bad, I don't think we know enough about how the world works to say that." The logical course, when removing a thing may have bad effects but you're not sure, is not to remove that thing. Manson's course is just the opposite. | 89-91 |
May 2005 | A team of scientists tasked by the National Marine Fisheries Service with reviewing the status of endangered salmon stocks found their scientific recommendations missing from the official report. Team leader Robert Paine, a world-renowned ecologist, said, "We were told to either strip out our recommendations or see our report end up in a drawer." The NMFS is part of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Paine further maintained that the NOAA policy of lumping wild and hatchery fish together into one population distorted the scientific picture. A federal district court had ruled in 2001 that counts of Oregon coho salmon should include hatchery-bred fish. Prior to that date, the NMFS had set protection policies based on solely the numbers of wild fish. But Paine's group found a scientific basis for segregating the two populations. |
NOAA instructed the scientific team to follow "consistent ecological principles." However, its true priorities were different. Many interest groups including farmers, ranchers and logging companies opposed protected status for the salmon. Mark Rutzick, appointed special advisor to the NOAA general counsel by President Bush in 2003, was formerly a lawyer for the timber industry, and strongly opposed regulations protecting fish and wildlife that the loggers viewed as overly burdensome. He oversaw the strategy of including hatchery fish with all 26 listed populations of Northwest salmon — a measure that would take them off the endangered species list. The draft policy did not call for de-listing any salmon population. But its census data virtually invited legal challenges that would accomplish this. Jim Lichatowich, a salmon expert and former NMFS scientist, likened the strategy to lumping humans and chimpanzees into one population. He charged that this policy was "setting salmon recovery back about one hundred years." |
91-93 |
Unknown | Samuel Bodman III, deputy secretary of commerce. As chair of the Interagency Working Group on Climate Change Science and Technology, tried to stall federal action on global warming. | Unknown. | 111-112 |
Unknown | Rebecca Watson, assistant interior secretary for land and minerals management. Former counsel for mining and timber industries. | Unknown. | 112 |
Unknown | Adam Sharp, associate assistant administrator for EPA Office of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxics. Former and subsequent lobbyist for the American Farm Bureau Federation, which consistently opposes environmental regulations on the agriculture industry. | Unknown. | 112 |
2003 | Gerald T. Keusch, director of NIH's Fogarty International Center (1998-2003). The Fogarty Center develops international research and training programs to address global health issues. When Keusch nominated 26 highly qualified people, including a Nobel laureate in medicine, for the Center's advisory board, they were approved by the NIH director within a week. But then Tommy Thompson's office sat on the list for months, ultimately rejecting 19 of them without explanation. | Keusch finally demanded a meeting with Thompson's staff to ask why. The reasons proved to be political and ideological. For example, the Nobel laureate, Thorsten Weisel, "had signed too many full-page letters in the New York Times critical of President Bush." Another candidate was rejected for being on the board of a reproductive health research organization. Apparently what made Jane Menken, a respected demographer, unacceptable was simply being a registered Democrat. | 114-115 |
Unknown | These political litmus tests were reported by many people, even those nominated for technical advisory positions that do not set policy. Some of them are: Laura Punnett, a university professor; Manuel Gomez, former director of scientific affairs at the American Industrial Hygiene Association; Pamela Kidd, associate dean of the College of Nursing at Arizona State University; William R. Miller, professor of psychology and psychiatry at the University of New Mexico and developer of a leading substance-abuse treatment; Sharon Smith, chair of the marine biology department at the University of Miami and an expert on Arctic ecology; Richard Myers, a Stanford University biochemist; George Weinstock of Baylor College of Medicine; and Claire Sterk, now serving at the National Institute on Drug Abuse. | The stories these people tell have three factors in common: They are all highly qualified for the positions they were denied; during the selection process they were asked political questions such as whether they liked President Bush, supported his policies, or had voted for him; they either admitted less than total support or refused to answer. Note that while two of these people (Myers and Sterk) had their rejections reversed, it happened only because of the intervention of high-ranking individuals. The pattern is indisputable. Political litmus tests are the order of the day thoughout the Bush administration. The case of engineer William E. Howard III is especially reprehensible. He was rejected for a Department of Defense advisory position for contributing to the 2004 presidential campaign of Senator John McCain (R-AZ). In fact the real contributor to McCain—a Republican, but an opponent of Bush—was one William S. Howard. |
116-123 |
Feb. 2004 | Sixty prominent scientists had just released a statement questioning the scientific integrity of the Bush administration. The Union of Concerned Scientists had issued the companion report Scientific Integrity in Policymaking to document the basis for the well-publicized "scientists' statement." The White House personnel office chose this month to notify Elizabeth Blackburn and William May that their appointments to the bioethics council would not be renewed. This case stands out because Dr. Blackburn is one of the world's top biomedical researchers. One of only three scientists on the council, she was dismissed after expressing disapproval of the fact that her views were omitted from the council's report. Chosen to replace her, William May, and another member who had previously resigned were two more nonscientists and Ben Carson, a pediatric neurosurgeon at Johns Hopkins Medical Center. All three of these new members held to the views of council chair Leon Kass, which is to say those of President Bush. |
Given the remarkable timing of these dismissals, it is not surprising that there was a backlash. An open letter to President Bush protesting the decision was signed by 170 scientists. Twenty-seven Democratic Senators, including then Senate minority leader Tom Daschle, also signed. | 128-130 |
Aug. 2001 | Irrelevantly invoking the dystopian vision of children raised in creches from Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, President Bush declared to the nation his policy on stem cell research. The president decreed that, since the destruction of a blastocyst from which stem cells are derived ends a human life, the federal government would not fund research using new stem cell lines. However, he said, he would allow funding for the use of sixty existing lines in research. | Bush sought little scientific advice before taking this position. (He might have consulted his science advisor; but, six months into his first term, he had yet to submit a candidate to the Senate.) Two problems resulted. First, there were in fact only nine genetically distinct lines. Second, all of these existing cells had been grown in live mice, which means they contain mouse viruses and are unsuitable for implantation in humans. A related issue is that the restriction on federal funding for stem cell research makes it likely that the best researchers will leave the country and America will fall behind in this important field. Bush's position raises a moral quandary as well. If he believes the destruction of a blastocyst is murder, he must also condemn private stem-cell research. For that matter, he cannot in good conscience allow in vitro fertilization — or even sexual intercourse, for some 80 percent of the blastocysts so created never survive. |
130-137 |
May 2005 | Legislation to strike down the restrictions President Bush placed on funding for stem cell research passed the House of Representatives. Subsequently, several directors at the National Institutes of Health spoke out against the restrictions. Elizabeth Nabel, Nora D. Volkow, and James Battey expressed concerns that NIH would lose its lead in this research. |
It is likely that the dissenting views of these NIH officials — Bush appointees all — are known to the public only because Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) solicited input from government scientists. On behalf of the Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, Senator Specter directed: "Your response should be submitted directly to the Subcommittee without editing, revision, or comment by the Department of Health and Human Services." | 137 |
Aug. 2005 | Speaking at the White House to a group of reporters from Texas, President Bush endorsed the idea of teaching "Intelligent Design" (creationism disguised with the trappings of science) in science classes along with evolution. | Although couched in terms of tolerance for different viewpoints, the president's remark shows his fundamental misunderstanding of science. Assuming it could be enacted without triggering a revolt, a policy of teaching intelligent design as scientific theory would contribute greatly to the decline of America's influence in the world. | 138 |
Unknown | Julie A. MacDonald, Interior Department's deputy assistant secretary for fish and wildlife and parks (2004 - 2007). Edited scientific reports to remove or weaken justification for preserving up to 100 endangered species. Leaked internal documents to industry lobbyists. | Subject of Interior Department IG investigation. Resigned 1 May 2007. | 177n35 |