NEITHER STAR WARS NOR SANCTUARY

In this useful book, Michael O'Hanlon points out that space has been "militarized" (to use the jargon Strobe Talbot professes to dislike) since the 1960s. Back then, in the Cold War years, the military use of space was limited to surveillance. Having the ability to monitor what "the other side" was doing helped maintain the strategic balance of power, and deserves a large part of the credit for enabling the world to avoid a nuclear conflagration. With the 1991 breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, this picture has changed. Space assets now are less a non-offensive bulwark against global thermonuclear war, to be held inviolate by all sides,1 than adjuncts to the targeting and communications capabilities of conventional warfare. As such, they become no more immune from attack than, say, Saddam Hussein's command and control bunker in Baghdad. It follows, then, that sound military policy would be to develop ways of neutralizing attacks on space assets.

Despite this, O'Hanlon takes the position that the U.S., for the very practical reason that it has the most to lose, should — in the near term — avoid placing weapons in space, or even developing anti-satellite weapons. He does advocate preventive measures. These include hardening satellites, local defenses, ways to rapidly replace lost assets, and certain arms-control treaties.

In the main, this is a sensible program. The book is well researched and very readable, with few errors (and no major ones). It contains many tables of useful information. Its chapter notes are extensive, and there is a good index. With the proviso that its coverage is broad rather than deep, I recommend it as a competent layman's introduction to the increasingly timely question of military space policy.

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