SPACEFLIGHT REVOLUTION

David Ashford begins this book by dipping into his personal history. He tells us that, when he interviewed for a job with the Advanced Projects Group at Hawker Siddeley Aviation, the interviewer was concerned about his mode of transportation. Learning that he rode a bicycle, the interviewer asked, "How much cycling would you do if your bike were scrapped after each ride?" Ashford allowed that he wouldn't do much under those conditions. It was the right answer, and it got Ashford his first job.

It was the right answer because it showed he understood the thinking that would have ended the dependence on expendable space launch vehicles. Ashford says of the work at the Advanced Projects Group, "We were planning aeroplanes that could fly to and from orbit to replace the ballistic missiles then being used to launch satellites, as well as airliners two or three times faster than Concorde and sub-orbital airliners that could fly from New York to Tokyo in 75 minutes." He then comments that he would likely have taken a different job had he known that, 42 years later, all satellites would still be launched by largely expendable vehicles and he would be writing a second book1 trying to revive that dream of the 1960s.

It was a dream held by many, as he reveals in Chapters 2 and 3 when he reprises the history of launch vehicle development. Not surprisingly, the Germans were the leaders after World War II, with their V-2 capable of sub-orbital space flight and plans for winged, piloted versions on the drawing board. That history might have been quite different, he avers, if such piloted spaceplanes had been available to capture when the Allies defeated the Third Reich. By 1959, the American X-15 was flying to the fringe of space, and all the major aerospace players in Britain and Europe as well as the United States were working on follow-ons to that reusable design. However, the political pressures of the Cold War demanded quick results, which meant pouring all available resources into developing expendable ballistic missile technology.

Chapter 4 presents an overview of the plans of Bristol Spaceplanes, Ltd. (Ashford's company) to develop a true spaceplane. It proceeds through four increasingly capable stages, culminating in a fully mature and reusable single-stage design after about fifteen years.

The remainder of the book explains why these plans are technically feasible and economically desirable. Ashford discusses the various aspects of the problem chapter by chapter. (See the Table of Contents, reproduced below.) He does not go into a great deal of detail. In fact, I would describe the whole book as an executive summary for the real report (as it in fact may be.) Critical factors like the nature of the vehicles' heat shields are barely mentioned. However, two appendices provide supporting material. One compares the Boeing 747 passenger jet airliner to Eugen Sänger's design (arguably the one with the most complete technical and cost estimates) for a two-stage spaceplane. The other derives the propellant mass-fraction figures of merit he uses in Table 8.1.

I do not fault Ashford for writing a "lightweight" treatment of the problem. It is intended for lay audiences, after all; to inundate them with equations and specifications would be counter-productive. As for the experts, they either have already joined the choir or work for companies that have a vested interest in the status quo. Nor do I mind that he pushes an airplane-like solution. Even though that would not be my choice, I grant that a rational argument can be made for it.

The book is well produced. In addition to the two appendices, it contains a glossary (before Chapter 1), a bibliography and an index. The text is supplemented by a generous quantity of pictures and graphs as well as illustrative drawings. I did find some questionable statements, and a few typos. These are discussed in the errata page, linked below.

Ashford makes his main points very well. I'll reproduce his words here:

• One might expect that the prospect of a thousandfold reduction in cost using mature developments of existing technology would be receiving priority attention from space agencies and aerospace corporations. That this is not the case is the major reason for this book. (Page 43)
• Given an inherently unsafe flying machine, adding a human pilot increases the cost; given an inherently safe one, it reduces cost. (Page 118)
• For some three decades, NASA and the other government space agencies have in effect suppressed the development of spaceplanes and thereby of low-cost access to orbit. There is no evidence of a conspiracy as such. Rather, it is a question of how large organizations with huge reserves of prestige and patronage, and paid for by the taxpayer, react almost subconsciously to the threat of change. It is a question of internal culture. (Page 151)

Note that these quotes follow extensive analysis; they are well-supported. I recommend this book to anyone concerned with lowering the cost of access to space.

To contact Chris Winter, send email to this address.
Copyright © 2003-2024 Christopher P. Winter. All rights reserved.
This page was last modified on 14 August 2024.