THE BETRAYAL

Cover image is of the original Norton edition, scanned, cropped and rescaled as appropriate — marks and all.

In the annals of America's Vietnam War period, Lieutenant Colonel William R. Corson, USMC should be recorded as a hero dedicated to achieving America's stated objectives of driving out the Communists and freeing that Asian country. Whether he is so recorded is another matter. He was, in the all-purpose in-group condemnation, "not a team player" — meaning that he saw America failing to achieve those objectives, understood the causes of her failure, and described those causes bluntly and publicly.

This book, The Betrayal, is a remarkable testament to the pervasiveness of the causes of America's failure in Viet Nam. It analyzes those causes in detail, with an insider's ability to give names and dates and a participant's ability to quote news accounts and official documents. It is not a balanced account. Lt. Col. Corson clearly feels outrage for the needless deaths of men under his command, frustration for the waste of effort and materiel, sympathy for the long-suffering peasants of Viet Nam and contempt for the various agencies and officials complicit in the war's failures. This comes through most clearly in Chapter 3, "Machiavellis in Khaki," and Chapter 11, "Birdwatching in Vietnam." But it is never far from the surface throughout the book. It is the contempt an honest man feels for those who are acting without honor.

The book spares no official. President Johnson, General Westmoreland, Secretary of State Allen Dulles, Ambassadors Henry Cabot Lodge and Ellsworth Bunker, the heads of the USAID, the various junketing Congressmen and other visitors1 all come in for their share of criticism. So too do the Vietnamese, from leaders like Ngo Dinh Diem and Nguyen Kao Ky through district chiefs (all GVN officers) such as Major Hao (pp 172-5.) It documents the corruption of the GVN, in which almost everyone is on the take (and what they take is usually American dollars, construction materials, and food and medicine.) He tells how assiduously the ARVN soldiers avoid combat with the Vietcong, often taking "French leave" as they learn of an impending firefight without telling the American military troops with whom they are supposedly allied.2 He describes how American officials on the scene typically stand by and do nothing. And he makes clear how all this is whitewashed for the American public.

The pacification program was America's official effort to garner popular support for the government of South Vietnam; to win "hearts and minds." It failed, because the GVN wasn't interested in the population's hearts and minds, only in their money. Corson calls this program the Other War; he and his Combined Action Platoons were the only ones to wage it successfully. The American public was assured that it was all going well, but two statistics debunk that fiction completely. They are the percentages of of hamlets with functioning councils, and of hamlet chiefs who spend the night in their supposedly secure beds, in hamlets where a CAP team operated or otherwise.3

And if statistics will not get the message across, there is no lack of anecdotes. Take the case of Phuoc Tu, who lost two of his three sons to Vietcong bullets. By law his third son was exempt from service; despite that, his third son was drafted. The result was that both Phuoc Tu and his son defected to the Vietcong.

I don't mean to give the impression that Corson gives a distorted account. He may not have included every relevant fact, but I'm certain that what he does include is accurate. As an able and intelligent soldier, he would not have risked tarnishing his career record in so foolish a way as to lie. Nor can he be viewed as "soft" on the North Vietnamese Communists; he labels the governments of both North and South Vietnam as despotic, and condemns the terrorism practiced by the Vietcong.

In addition to its admirable bluntness, Corson's book is remarkable for its scholarship. In addition to knowing a great deal about Asian history and culture, and being able to speak Chinese as well as the three dialects of Vietnamese fluently,4 the man was very well read on history in general.

If his account has any defect, it is that it is too detailed, too filled with embarrassing incidents and incriminating statistics. But that is also its strength: the strength of the man who tells the unvarnished truth no matter who it might offend. And, in 1968, there were plenty of people who would have been mightily offended by the truths Lt. Col. Corson revealed. (Would have, and should have.)5 But not mightily enough to turn the situation around, as our eventual expulsion from South Viet Nam in 1975 proves.

There are other defects, relatively minor ones. Corson sometimes uses obscure phrases or references (e.g. "Navarre plan" and "'toothpaste' percentages", page 29) without explaining or defining them. Also there are occasional errors of grammar, probably the fault of the book's editor. And the book lacks an index; this would have been very helpful. But, like William Lederer's Our Own Worst Enemy, Corson's book provides important documents in Appendices. Since it lacks an index, I cannot rate it a keeper, except for Vietnam War history buffs. But this was an important book in its time, and its message remains important because we are making similar mistakes in other places.

In the last chapter of the book Corson offers a set of proposals. They cover both alternatives — staying in or getting out. These are his six proposals for the former case:

1. Stop the air war in the North. It is counterproductive.
2. End all illegal land rents and agricultural taxes in Vietnam.
3. Build schools, train teachers and promote universal education.
4. Take care of civilian refugees and casualties.
5. Take direct control of humanitarian aid (Cut out the GVN).
6. Cut our ground forces back to 250,000 troops and restructure our forces.6

These are not pie-in-the-sky stuff, but solid recommendations, drawn from his extensive experience. If followed, they might well have given us a different outcome in Viet Nam. Sadly, they were not heeded. I'll quote from the Introduction, by William Lederer, as to his view of the prospects back then.

And not only in Asia, but in today's Middle East, where, in essence, they still are not being heeded. This book, therefore, is a must read. But it's only a keeper for history buffs.

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This page was last modified on 7 April 2016.